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BTS: Your aim is to move the animal-rights debate beyond the 
field of ethics and into political philosophy. Drawing insights 
from citizenship theory, Zoopolis proposes recognizing domes-
ticated animals as full citizens of our communities, treating 
wild animals who live outside our communities as members of 
their own sovereign communities, and treating those “liminal” 
non-domesticated animals who live within the spaces of our 
communities as denizens with appropriate rights. This is an am-
bitious vision that would fundamentally transform our under-
standing of politics and how we think about our communal life. 
The initial reaction of many will be that this vision is wildly 
utopian and impracticable. And yet you claim that it actually 
stands a better chance of success than traditional animal-rights 
theory (ART). Could you explain?
DONALDSON/KYMLICKA: As many others have noted, 
traditional ART often seems committed to a strange and unat-
tractive view of “species apartheid,” as Ralph Acampora once 
called it. For Francione (explicitly) and Regan (implicitly), we 
humans meet our obligations of justice to animals by cutting 
off all relations with them—we live in our world, and we “let 
them be” to live freely in their world, with as little interaction 
as possible. However, an effective animal-rights strategy can-
not be based on this vision. For one thing, it fails to offer any 
guidance on many of the fundamental issues we face. Humans 
and nonhumans do not inhabit separate worlds, but inevitably 
share the same homes, cities, and territories. This is the case not 
just with domesticated animals, but also many kinds of wildlife 
(think raccoons, rats, crows, squirrels, etc.) who have adapted 
to human built environments. Every time we erect a building, 
a roadway, a fence, or a dam, we are having an impact on ani-
mals. If ART is to contribute to these debates, we need to think 
about what justice requires in conditions of co-existence, not 
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radical separation. Our Zoopolis model may be ambitious in its 
vision of human-animal relations, but it takes seriously the re-
alities of species intermingling, rather than wishing them away.
The species apartheid vision is not just unrealistic; it’s unat-
tractive to many people who love animals, and want to live with 
animals in a just social arrangement. Traditional ART rightly 
highlights all the ways humans harm and exploit animals, and 
this emphasis on suffering and harm provides one important in-
spiration for animal advocacy. But we think even more people 
would be inspired if we were to highlight as well the potential 
positives in human-animal relations, rather than assuming that 
these relations are inherently unjust. Our Zoopolis model draws 
strength from the many examples of animal advocates and re-
searchers who have figured out important lessons about how 
to co-exist with other animals, and indeed create new forms 
of community together. While our theoretical constructions 
of animal citizenship and animal sovereignty may seem novel 
and unfamiliar—and certainly no government has come close 
to endorsing them—they are intended to help make sense of 
a wide range of actually-existing experiments in inter-species 
justice. Paradoxically, traditional ART provides very little help 
in understanding some of the most exciting developments in 
animal rights, whether in terms of rewilding to support wil-
derness animals, or co-existence projects for liminal animals 
like coyotes or pigeons, or intentional communities that view 
domesticated animals as full members.
We should also note that while it may be novel to apply citi-
zenship concepts to animals, we have a long history of figuring 
out how to make these concepts do real work in the human 
context. On questions of human diversity (across gender, race, 
ethnicity, culture, age, ability, sexual orientation), we have 
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learned many lessons about how to create forms of citizenship 
which are inclusive, while respecting difference. Similarly, we 
have learned about negotiating diversity at a more global level, 
about how states can cooperate, and help one another, and re-
spect (or at least tolerate) differences rather than engaging in 
endless processes of invasion and colonization. It’s a central 
part of our story that many of these lessons are transferable. 
There’s a vast store of concrete knowledge and experience in 
the human case which can be transferred to similar challenges 
of inclusion, accommodation, cooperation, and diplomacy in 
our relations with animals. Traditional ART rightly highlights 
parallels between our treatment of animals and various human 
injustices (slavery, torture, colonization, genocide), but we can 
also learn a great deal by considering parallels in how we have 
advanced justice, and citizenship concepts have been a vital 
part of this in the human case. We think these concepts and 
lessons have a real resonance that ART can take advantage of.
BTS: You criticize ART for focusing on intrinsic capacities and 
negative rights. What is the problem here?
DONALDSON/KYMLICKA: To be very clear, our criticism 
is of the exclusive focus on negative rights. We support the ba-
sic AR position that all sentient beings have basic inviolable 
negative rights (not to be killed, harmed, tortured, imprisoned, 
enslaved, denied the necessities of life). Anyone who has a sub-
jective experience of life is vulnerable in ways that require the 
protection of basic negative rights. Our criticism of traditional 
ART is that it focuses on these rights to the exclusion of what 
we call membership or citizenship rights, i.e., the rights that 
individuals have by virtue of membership in different political 
communities. Consider the human context. All humans, across 
the globe, have basic human rights to life and liberty. These 
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are shared, universal rights. But humans also belong to distinct 
political communities, and this generates territorially-specific 
citizenship rights. As a Canadian citizen I have certain rights 
and responsibilities in Canada which do not apply when I travel 
to Sweden. For example, I have the right to vote in Canada, 
and the right to public subsidies for education, housing, or job 
training (and the responsibility to pay income tax to support 
these rights of membership). I would not expect any of these 
rights (or responsibilities) as a visitor to Sweden. Universal 
basic rights are of fundamental importance, but membership 
rights are equally important to creating the social contexts that 
support the flourishing of their members. A world in which hu-
mans only had universal basic rights accorded to all based on 
their intrinsic moral status—but no citizenship rights based on 
membership in particular societies—would be a morally im-
poverished one.
Our argument in Zoopolis is that the same basic logic ap-
plies to animals. They are not just sentient individuals entitled 
to universal negative rights. They are also members of distinct 
political communities entitled to membership rights. In the case 
of domesticated animals, the relevant political community is a 
mixed human-animal community, and so they should be seen 
as members of our society and as our co-citizens. In the case 
of truly wild animals, we should think of them as forming their 
own distinct and sovereign wild-animal communities, with 
rights to live autonomously on their own territory. Liminal ani-
mals occupy an in-between position, reflecting their status as 
living amongst us but not as cooperating with us. They are nei-
ther fully members of a shared society with us nor fully sover-
eign of us, yet with aspects of both membership and sovereign-
ty. Sorting out these issues of membership is crucial to creating 
justice and enabling flourishing for animals, as for humans.
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The problem with traditional ART is not just that it is incom-
plete in virtue of ignoring these membership rights. The deeper 
problem is that by focusing exclusively on negative rights we 
can be led to very perverse conclusions regarding our obliga-
tions of justice. For example, one way to ensure that we no 
longer kill, torture, own, or enslave domesticated animals is to 
bring about their extinction. If they no longer exist, we cannot 
violate their negative rights. This is an evasion of justice, not 
a solution to injustice, in part because it ignores the fact that 
domesticated animals have membership rights in our society. 
We cannot focus single-mindedly on reducing harm, suffering, 
and negative-rights violations. We must also figure out how to 
create the positive conditions in which everyone can flourish.
BTS: Animals have typically been excluded from the moral 
community because they lack rational moral agency. ART has 
argued that moral agency ought not to be a condition of mem-
bership; animals, like many humans who cannot rationally re-
flect on moral principles, are moral patients—i.e., what hap-
pens to them matters to them and this fact is enough to give 
them significant moral status. By contrast, you adopt a broader 
notion of moral agency, one that includes many who are not 
rational. What is this broader notion, and why adopt it?
DONALDSON/KYMLICKA: Once again, our position is 
more an addition to the traditional ART position than a rejec-
tion of it. We agree with traditional AR theorists that sentience, 
not moral agency, is the basis for intrinsic moral status or mem-
bership in the moral community, and the inviolable negative 
rights that go with this. However, when we talk about political 
community, ideas of agency are crucial. Our model of animal 
citizenship (for domesticated animals) and animal sovereignty 
(for wilderness animals) rests on assumptions about the capac-
Angus Taylor
146
© Between the Species, 2014
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/
Vol. 17, Issue 1
ity of animals to be active shapers of their own lives and of the 
terms of their relationship with us, not just passive recipients of 
human beneficence.
If humans and animals lived in radical separation it might 
be sufficient to think of animals as moral patients, since our 
obligations to animals would start and stop with leaving them 
alone. How they might or might not enact their agency within 
their own societies would not be our concern. But if we rec-
ognize the inevitability (and desirability) of co-existence, and 
shared forms of society, then it is vital that we think of animals 
not just as passive recipients of our care, but as active subjects 
who, to varying degrees, have capacities for being partners or 
co-creators in the kinds of relationships we have with them, 
and the kinds of societies we share. Ideas of consultation, par-
ticipation, and consent go to the core of our “political theory of 
animal rights”, since they are central to ideas of political com-
munity and legitimacy.
Figuring out how to create opportunities for animals to be 
agents in their relations with us—and how to ensure that we 
interpret their agency correctly—are obviously huge challeng-
es. But here is one of the many contexts where we can learn 
important lessons from human struggles for justice. In recent 
decades, children’s rights advocates and disability advocates 
have forcefully challenged the reigning ideology (at least in 
Western democracies) which positions them strictly as wards 
of the state rather than full citizens. They do not want to sim-
ply be passive recipients of the state’s protection and provision. 
They want to participate in key decisions affecting their lives, 
and in shaping a shared society so that it is designed, from the 
ground up, with them as full and equal members, not as af-
terthoughts subject to paternalistic management. The slogan of 
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the disability rights movement “Nothing about us without us” 
helps capture this idea. Yet, particularly in relation to young 
children and those with severe intellectual disability, this par-
ticipation will not take the form of rational deliberation about 
propositions on moral principles. Enabling agency and partici-
pation in these contexts requires creating news ways of solicit-
ing and being responsive to individuals’ subjective good, rely-
ing on more embodied forms of communication made possible 
by particular forms of trust and cooperation, themselves rooted 
in underlying moral emotions and pro-social dispositions. A lot 
of work has been done recently in developing these more ex-
pansive or inclusive ideas of agency, and we firmly believe they 
are relevant for thinking about animal agency as well. Animals, 
like humans, differ widely in their capacities for agency, but 
we must recognize, respect, and nurture these capacities where 
they exist. Anything less is domination.
BTS: You firmly reject the “extinctionist” policy regarding do-
mesticated animals. Why?
DONALDSON/KYMLICKA: We have three primary objec-
tions to the extinctionist policy. First of all, extinctionists often 
speak of domesticated animals as though they are inherently 
deformed—slavish, incompetent, and diminished shadows of 
their majestic and free-living forebears. It is always troubling 
when individuals and groups are stigmatized as inherently un-
dignified in this way. Each of us is a unique individual, with 
unique capacities, and we have an inherent dignity regardless 
of how we compare to others. Domesticated animals may have 
been bred for dependence on humans, but we are all dependent 
on others to varying degrees and in different ways across the 
life span, and there is nothing inherently undignified in this. 
The more dependent amongst us are no less dignified than 
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the most independent or self-sufficient. Indignity arises when 
others, and society, respond to our dependency with mockery, 
abuse, or neglect.
Think about dogs. Dogs (and their wolf ancestors) are a high-
ly social species. Through domestication they have evolved to 
be highly attentive to humans, to love us, to care about us, to 
want to be with us, and to cooperate with us (and with each oth-
er). And, we might add, humans have evolved to have a similar 
orientation to dogs. Many dog breeds are quite dependent on us 
for forms of care and protection. Does this make them some-
how less dignified than members of self-sufficient and solitary 
species such as tigers or crocodiles? Are humans less digni-
fied than tigers and crocodiles because we are members of a 
highly social, cooperative, and interdependent species? It’s true 
that domesticated animal breeding, undertaken to serve human 
interests and whims, has resulted in many chronic health prob-
lems for animals, but this does not mean that those individuals 
lack in dignity, and many of these problems would disappear 
again if domesticated animals regained significant control over 
their sex and reproductive lives.
That brings us to the second problem with extinctionism, 
namely, that bringing it about would require involuntarily ster-
ilizing all domesticated animals (or involuntarily confining 
them to sex-segregated spaces). In the human case, proposals 
to coercively sterilize individuals, and to deny them the op-
portunity to bear and raise young, are viewed with deep suspi-
cion. Sex and reproduction are not entirely unregulated (e.g., 
we have laws against coerced sex, sex with minors, etc.), and 
we do engage in paternalistic interventions (e.g., in the case 
of children, or of individuals lacking the intellectual capacity 
to consent to sex, especially if their health would be endan-
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gered by pregnancy). But these regulations and paternalistic 
interventions must meet a very high standard of justification, 
either in terms of protecting third parties from sexual predation 
or coercion, or protecting the interests of the individual whose 
sexuality is being restricted. Defenders of extinctionism, by 
contrast, typically justify this policy as protecting future gen-
erations of domesticated animals who are at risk of being born 
into slavery/domination. They have not explained how this co-
ercive interference in sex and reproduction is in the interests of 
the individual animals who will be sterilized or segregated, and 
hence have not explained why it should not be seen as a serious 
violation of their basic interests in sexuality, freedom of asso-
ciation, or family life.
And finally, as noted earlier, we consider the extinctionist 
policy an evasion of justice, not a solution to injustice. When 
a human group has been incorporated into a society as a caste 
group to serve others (as with slaves), our solution to the prob-
lem is not to bring about the group’s extinction, but to make 
them full and equal members of the moral community. The 
overarching goal is not just to end domination or servitude—
we could accomplish that by nuking the planet. The goal is to 
give full recognition, respect, and rights to individuals as they 
are, and to move forward in relations of justice that will allow 
all to flourish in the ways that they can. Of course, many ex-
tinctionists are deeply sceptical that relations between humans 
and domesticated animals can ever be just. But as we noted 
earlier, a large part of this scepticism rests on an indefensible 
assumption that domesticated animals are somehow degraded 
or unnatural in their very nature, regardless of how we treat 
them. In any event, we clearly have a duty to at least try to cre-
ate relations of justice, rather than just washing our hands of 
domesticated animals by imposing extinction on them.
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BTS: Among the issues you touch on briefly is the vexed one 
of medical experimentation. You reject the idea that medical 
research that involves harming animals can be justified on the 
basis of lifeboat cases (where some individuals are facing great 
harm and someone among them must be sacrificed): the ani-
mals on whom we experiment are not themselves facing harm 
until we decide to harm them. Yet you justify the non-lifeboat 
exploitation of animals by members of pre-modern societies 
in circumstances of necessity. Almost everyone would agree 
that people in the past (or even present) who have had to hunt 
animals for survival have had the right to do so. How then is the 
modern child who needs a transplanted pig’s heart-valve in or-
der to survive any different from the child of the palaeolithic or 
indigenous hunter who needs the meat from a wild boar in or-
der to survive? Why does one case fall outside “circumstances 
of justice” but not the other?
DONALDSON/KYMLICKA: Well, consider a case where a 
modern child needs a transplanted human heart-valve in order 
to survive. We don’t think it’s permissible to snatch a human 
from another society in order to harvest his or her organs, even 
if these organs could be used to save several individuals need-
ing transplants. If an individual’s tragic need for a transplant 
does not justify suspending the principles of justice that govern 
relations within our society or between societies, why would it 
justify suspending principles of justice in relation to pigs? 
Figuring out how exactly to specify the “circumstances of 
justice” is a tricky affair. There is no definitive or canonical list 
of the necessary and sufficient conditions to determine wheth-
er we are in the circumstances of justice (in relation to other 
humans or animals). But it’s important to remember that this 
idea is invoked within political theory to make sense of ex ante 
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collective commitments to justice—that is, to explain why and 
under what conditions people would commit to collectively 
govern their future relations through principles of justice. Such 
a commitment is not realistic if one group’s survival systemati-
cally depends on the destruction, displacement, or domination 
of another group. But under propitious circumstances, people 
can make a credible commitment to pursue their own flourish-
ing in ways that allow for the flourishing of others. This is the 
commitment we have made to other humans within our society, 
as well as to other human societies, even though we know that 
there will be tragic cases of individual need that go unfulfilled 
due to this commitment (as when a child needs a human heart 
transplant). Moral progress throughout history is in large part 
a progressive expansion of this commitment. While we never 
have a guarantee that our individual survival will not require 
the use of others, we nonetheless commit ourselves ex ante to 
pursuing our flourishing in ways that respect the rights of oth-
ers, and the circle of this commitment has expanded histori-
cally. We are now in a position to expand it yet again to include 
animals.
BTS: So your perspective is sensitive to the historical context 
of human interaction with animals. This is surely important 
in countering charges that ART is a merely an indulgence of 
privileged Westerners or, worse, that it exhibits a contemptu-
ous attitude toward other cultures or the poor. But where do 
we draw the line if we are not to slide into cultural relativism? 
What ethical weight should we allow traditional cultural values 
regarding animals to carry in today’s world?
DONALDSON/KYMLICKA: The treatment of animals pro-
vides no grounds for Westerners to feel superior to other cul-
tures, given that it is the West that is responsible for inventing 
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and then diffusing the techniques of industrial-scale animal ex-
ploitation, whereas many non-Western societies have histori-
cally had much more respectful relations with animals. Viewed 
objectively, respect for animals is clearly not the exclusive 
property of any one race, culture, or civilization—and certain-
ly not the West. For centuries, Western societies have defined 
animals as “property,” and our current concepts and categories 
for discussing animals (e.g., “livestock”) are deeply imbricated 
in this property framework. We need entirely new models for 
thinking about human-animal relations, and non-Western soci-
eties are a rich source of ideas here. For example, some com-
munities in South America view dogs as village dogs, members 
of the village but not the property of any one individual or fam-
ily. We can learn from this, or from the way other communities 
negotiate tolerant co-existence with feral or liminal animals, 
rather than resorting to the extermination strategies that we in 
the West so often rely on.
As with human rights, any sensible approach to animal 
rights will combine certain universal norms with recognition 
of the inevitable and appropriate diversity in implementation 
and interpretation. For example, different societies and differ-
ent cultures will make different choices about how to balance 
freedom and protection from risk. We can see this in the way 
different societies deal with restrictions on children’s activities 
and mobility in order to reduce risks. Similar issues will arise 
in relation to animals, and there is no one right answer here. 
Similarly, different societies are in very different situations in 
terms of their ability to achieve certain rights, particularly posi-
tive social and political rights. For example, a very poor soci-
ety might not be able to afford free secondary education for 
its children, but should work towards this goal, and children’s 
education in a low-tech agricultural society might strike a dif-
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ferent balance between practical and more abstract forms of 
learning than a highly technological and industrialized society. 
We should expect similar legitimate variations in how societies 
understand the socialization and contribution of animals.
We can learn here from the UN Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, which provides a helpful framework for think-
ing about rights in a diverse global context. It recognizes ap-
propriate diversity and conditionality in the interpretation of 
children’s rights, but insists that this should not be confused 
with cultural relativism with regard to basic negative rights. No 
society has the right to kill, torture, enslave, or deny the neces-
sities of life to its members in the name of culture. Whenever 
we impose harms on others—human or animal—it is not suf-
ficient to say “this is what we do around here.” All of us must 
be held morally accountable for how we treat others. There are 
vegans and AR activists in all cultures, working to reform and 
re-imagine their cultural practices in line with changes in our 
understanding of animals, and the changing circumstances of 
justice. And this is vital if we want to achieve meaningful, and 
lasting, reform.
BTS: You suggest predation as one means of controlling lim-
inal populations. But in some cases introduced predators might 
pose dangers to humans or might have unforeseen deleterious 
effects on fauna and flora. Aren’t there circumstances, not ter-
ribly unusual, where we ought to bite the bullet—use the bul-
let, or whatever—and just cull animals ourselves? Won’t there 
inevitably be a certain amount of violence in our relations with 
liminal creatures, including those displaced or killed (intention-
ally or unintentionally) by agriculture?
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DONALDSON/KYMLICKA: It’s true that there will inevita-
bly be violence, conflict, and inadvertent harm in our relations 
with liminal animals, and indeed all creatures, including our 
fellow humans. For example, we know that cars cause signifi-
cant human casualties, and not just to those who choose to drive 
but also to innocent bystanders. These casualties aren’t directly 
intended, but they are inevitable. In Zoopolis we discuss in 
some depth how to think about the trade-offs between risk to 
individuals and the benefits to society of roadways—e.g., how 
we decide when risks are simply negligent, and how we decide 
whether risks are borne fairly amongst all members of society, 
or disproportionately borne by certain segments. Human social 
life inevitably creates risks and burdens for individuals, and 
the goal should be a fair distribution of these inevitable and 
inadvertent risks, not their complete elimination, even though 
this means any one of us might end up being the unlucky indi-
vidual at the wrong place at the wrong time. But it’s essential to 
note that accepting the inevitability of inadvertent risk does not 
justify the direct and targeted harm or killing of individuals in 
order to benefit society. Just because an individual might be the 
unlucky victim of socially beneficial roads (or trains or planes 
or power lines, etc.) doesn’t mean that we can turn around and 
kill individuals in order to help reduce health care costs, or to 
reduce overpopulation.
The same general principles apply in our relations to ani-
mals. Precisely because the “species apartheid” vision is unre-
alistic, we will inevitably be entangled with animals in various 
ways, and this will inevitably involve imposing risks. We need 
to acknowledge these risks, to minimize them where possible, 
and think about how the risks and benefits of these entangle-
ments can be fairly distributed. At the moment, the arrange-
ment between humans and nonhumans has been that we gain 
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all of the benefits of mutual relations, at minimal risk, while 
they bear all of the costs, with very few benefits. We need to 
completely rethink what it means to share society, and social 
risks, with nonhumans. This is a major challenge, but it is es-
sential to emphasize that, as in the human case, the permissibil-
ity of imposing risks (when fairly distributed) provides no jus-
tification for direct intentional harm. I am certainly justified in 
stopping (even if it means killing) a liminal animal who poses 
an immediate threat to my life (just as I would be justified to 
kill a human in such an instance), but this right of self-defence 
is completely different from the idea that we can kill individu-
als (human or animal) to achieve social beneficial outcomes, 
like reducing population stresses. So neither the permissibility 
of imposing risks (when fairly distributed) nor the permissibil-
ity of self-defence (in cases of imminent threat) provide a jus-
tification for “culling” animals. A certain amount of violence is 
indeed inevitable in our relations with animals, as with humans, 
but this is not a license to kill. In general, we should assume 
that any actions which would be unacceptable vis-à-vis our fel-
low humans (e.g., population culling), are at least prima facie 
unacceptable in comparable circumstances vis-à-vis animals.
BTS: We wouldn’t introduce cougars into our settlements to 
control human population, regardless of the benefit to society 
and however fairly distributed the risk might be—we should 
be able to control our own population without such drastic 
measures and without unacceptably restricting individual lib-
erty. But, if I read you right, the value of liberty to individual 
rodents, combined with our limited means of controlling their 
numbers, might justify using cats as predators. Doesn’t this 
amount to “culling” by other means?
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DONALDSON/KYMLICKA: The hunting behaviour of cats 
is a thorny issue on many grounds. Cats are the only domesti-
cated animal that is truly carnivorous and predatory, and this 
complicates their place in our theory. But to (over)simplify our 
account, we argue that insofar as cats are companion animals, 
then they are our co-citizens, and as such are subject to the same 
obligations as all citizens not to violate the rights of other ani-
mals. So no, we are not permitted to bring cats into our homes 
and encourage them to kill mice or rats, and we must monitor 
them outside to protect other animals (and find adequate forms 
of nutrition for them that do not require killing other animals). 
As for the rodents or other so-called “pests” (Canada geese, 
coyotes, pigeons, and so on), in Zoopolis we discuss many non-
violent strategies for resolving conflicts with liminal animals 
(barriers and other modifications of the physical environment, 
population suppression through control of food sources, con-
traception, etc.).
The case of feral cats is different. In at least some cases, feral 
cats would qualify as liminal animals on our account, many 
of whom are predatory (e.g., coyotes, foxes, raccoons, hawks). 
We are not responsible for regulating the diet of liminal ani-
mals, or for intervening in predator-prey relations amongst 
them. For example, we are not responsible for protecting spar-
rows (or mice) from hawks, and so too we would not be re-
sponsible for protecting mice from feral cats. But this raises a 
very difficult issue about whether we should enable companion 
cats to become feral cats. It is part of our citizenship model that 
domesticated animals should be allowed to explore (safe, par-
tial, gradual) exit options from human society, and we expect 
that some domesticated animals—some horses, for example—
might well choose over time a more feral existence. But horses 
do not pose a lethal threat to other animals, whereas feral cats 
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have no natural predators in many contexts, and the birds and 
small animals that they prey on have not evolved to protect 
themselves from cats. In general, we argue that it is impermis-
sible for humans to introduce species under these conditions. 
And so cats pose a conflict regarding how to weigh these two 
dimensions of our theory. This is one of many dilemmas we do 
not fully resolve in Zoopolis.
BTS: Many philosophers have argued that rights are applicable 
only within human society, where members must articulate 
claims against each other. The late Canadian naturalist John 
A. Livingston contended that extending rights to all of nature 
would amount to domesticating the entire planet. How does it 
make sense to talk of the rights of wild animals if they are to 
be regarded as members of sovereign communities, beyond hu-
man control?
DONALDSON/KYMLICKA: Whenever we talk of rights—
whether human or animal—we need to clarify what is the moral 
purpose these rights are supposed to serve. On our account, the 
primary moral purpose of sovereignty rights is to protect orga-
nized forms of life on a specific territory from external threats 
of invasion, colonization, resource theft, and spillover harms 
(e.g., water pollution, radiation leaks, climate change). When-
ever the wellbeing of individuals (human or animal) is tied up 
with the ability of their community to live autonomously on 
their territory, then we have the prima facie basis for claims to 
sovereignty. Sovereignty rights therefore combine a commu-
nity’s right to live autonomously with what Avery Kolers calls 
“a right to place.” According such rights to wild-animal com-
munities, far from leading to domestication or colonization, is 
needed precisely in order to protect wild animals from domes-
tication or colonization by humans.
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The situation would be very different if we said that humans 
had the sovereign responsibility to regulate how wild animals 
treat each other within their territories. If we said that human 
political communities had the responsibility for protecting prey 
from predators, for example, then we would be going down the 
road to human management and control of all of nature. The 
various wild animal species who share sovereign wilderness 
territory often are in competition with each other, but they typi-
cally share an interest in avoiding foreign domination, control, 
or injustice, and it is this shared interest that grounds the claim 
to sovereignty rights against human colonization. So, when we 
speak about rights for wild-animal communities, we agree it 
does not make sense to speak of individual animals having the 
right that we humans protect them from each other. But it does 
make sense to speak of wild-animal communities having rights 
claims against humans who would destroy their habitats, steal 
their resources, or colonize their territories. They need these 
rights precisely in order that they not be domesticated or colo-
nized by humans, and brought under human management and 
control.
BTS: You say that respect for the sovereignty of wild-animal 
communities will require an end to the expansion of human 
settlement. Won’t this in turn require an end to human popu-
lation growth? Won’t it also require an end to some forms of 
economic growth?
DONALDSON/KYMLICKA: Yes, to both questions. While 
it might be possible for humans to live sustainably, at current 
population levels, on the lands that we already occupy, this 
would be enormously challenging. It probably makes a lot 
more sense to gradually reduce our population: a) by making 
sure that girls and women have full access to education, em-
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ployment, health care, and contraception—policies which have 
proven their effectiveness in reducing population growth to re-
placement or below-replacement levels; and b) by challenging 
excessively pro-natal policies and norms.
Respect for wild-animal sovereignty will require enormous 
changes to resource-based economies which are built on the 
plunder of territories occupied by wild animals. And we should 
note that the required change goes well beyond so called “sus-
tainable” resource development. For example, it might be sus-
tainable (for humans) to engage in certain logging or mining 
practices, as long as the level of exploitation is regulated so that 
degraded environments represent a small percentage of total 
wilderness at any given time, and have sufficient time to recov-
er (a sort of “crop-rotation” mentality of resource extraction). 
The problem with this approach is that it permits any amount of 
harm to individual wild animals as long as their species popula-
tions will recover. On a sovereignty model, by contrast, we need 
to start from the premise that their territory is precisely their 
territory—it doesn’t belong to us, and isn’t ours to exploit, even 
in a “sustainable” manner. And so human activity in sovereign 
wild-animal territory would have to fully respect their rights 
not to be harmed by our activities, or have their environments 
degraded. In practical terms, this has enormous implications 
in terms of us ending our profligate waste of resources, and 
instead learning to conserve, recover, and reuse the resources 
that we already control. This may seem like a huge burden, but 
it’s also an enormous opportunity. The discipline of actually 
living within our means, instead of drawing on a blank cheque 
from nature and animals, is the kind of spur to human ingenuity 
which could lead to very creative ways of re-imagining human 
society and economic activity. Many people are already explor-
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ing models of ethical sustainability on a small scale, and com-
ing up with creative and exciting solutions.
It’s also important to remember that while respecting wild-
animal rights will limit our access to certain resources, it will 
dramatically increase availability of others. For example, by 
switching from an animal to a plant-based diet, we could free 
up enormous resources of land, energy, and water. These re-
sources could be redirected to developing new forms of sus-
tainable economic life, and they could be redirected to wild-
animal communities, allowing them to recover and expand.
BTS: Zoopolis addresses the question of our relations with ani-
mals in an explicitly political framework. Yet it says little about 
the economic imperatives that drive much of political life. In 
particular, capitalism militates against viewing non-human na-
ture as anything but a storehouse of resources to be exploited 
for capital accumulation. Must effective animal advocacy be 
part of the struggle to transcend, or at least radically transform, 
capitalism? And if the prospect for transcending or radically 
transforming capitalism in the foreseeable future is grim, does 
that mean the prospect for animal liberation must be at least as 
grim?
DONALDSON/KYMLICKA: We certainly need to change 
the economic imperatives—as we just noted in our previous 
answer—and this is obviously a big challenge. Fredric Jameson 
once said that humans seem to have an easier time imagining 
the total environmental collapse of the earth than imagining an 
alternative to capitalism, which is a depressing thought. But 
in our view, the causal links between animal exploitation and 
capitalism may be more complicated than many people realize. 
It is widely assumed that we instrumentalize animals because 
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we live in a capitalist society. But some historians argue it is ac-
tually the reverse: the instrumentalization of animals preceded, 
and made possible, the rise of capitalism. Similarly, whereas 
Francione says that we feel free to mistreat animals because 
they are defined as property, many commentators argue it is 
the reverse: society defined animals as property because we 
felt free to mistreat them. All of this suggests that the roots of 
the instrumentalization of animals are older and deeper than 
capitalism or particular property regimes, and that getting rid of 
capitalism, on its own, might actually do very little to change 
those deeper roots. This indeed seems to be the lesson from 
the experience of Communist regimes in the twentieth century, 
which shared a deeply instrumental view of animals despite 
their rejection of capitalism and profit motives, and which were 
a disaster for animals. At the end of the day, the real enemy is 
ideologies of human supremacism, and far too often, the pro-
posed alternatives to capitalism have shared in these suprema-
cist ideologies. Of course, as a result of capitalism, we now 
have very powerful vested corporate interests in the exploita-
tion of animals, who will resist any concerted social movement 
to challenge supremacist ideologies. But the sad truth is that we 
don’t yet have a truly concerted social movement for animal 
rights, at least not here in Canada, and it’s neither helpful nor 
accurate to lay that failure solely at the door of capitalism. Nor 
should we go completely in the other direction, and blame the 
instrumentalization of animals entirely at the door of, say, the 
Bible and Christianity, with its divine sanctioning of human 
supremacy. We seem to face a toxic brew of cultural, religious, 
and economic drivers of animal exploitation, all of which need 
to be tackled.
BTS: Historically, the political left in general has not chal-
lenged industrial society’s focus on maximizing material pro-
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duction and consumption. The traditional left has shown little 
interest in the sustainability of ecosystems and even less inter-
est in animal rights. From the other direction, criticisms of ART 
by theorists of holistic environmentalism, as well as the val-
ues of environmentalist “humane meat” movements that have 
sprung up in recent years, show that critics of industrialism are 
not necessarily sympathetic to animal rights. Why has the left 
been so uninterested in, or even hostile to, animal advocacy? 
And what likelihood is there that even a revamped, green left 
will see animal rights as anything more than a contentious side 
issue?
DONALDSON/KYMLICKA: The left’s indifference to hu-
man violence against animals is a deeply puzzling problem. 
This is actually the topic of a recent paper of ours (Kymlic-
ka and Donaldson 2014). One puzzle is the strained relations 
between animal advocates and the ecologists/greens. On our 
view, veganism is not just compatible with environmentalism, 
but would seem to be the heart and soul of environmentalism. 
The enormous destructive impact of animal agriculture, and 
loss of animal habitat, mean that these movements should be 
fundamentally allied. So why does the environmental move-
ment seem to be embracing the “humane meat” vision of sus-
tainability, even though it’s not supported by the evidence, 
which shows that animal agriculture of any type on any sig-
nificant scale is unsustainable? Part of the answer, no doubt, is 
that many environmentalists just can’t bring themselves to give 
up their favourite meat and dairy. But it also appears to be a 
strategic decision stemming from fear that the green movement 
will be marginalized if it embraces veganism and animal rights. 
If so, it’s a bad decision, not only because it means potential al-
liances are lost, but also because it means that the green move-
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ment is complicit in legitimating a meat diet that is not only 
animal-destroying but also earth-destroying.
So we need to address this fear that embracing veganism 
and animal rights is a recipe for marginalization. This fear is 
keeping many progressive movements from taking the animal 
issue on board. Animal-rights advocates have rightly been de-
scribed as the “orphans of the left”—a progressive movement 
abandoned by other progressive movements, in order that they 
too do not become orphans of the left.
How do we change this? It will clearly require engaging in 
a lot of “difficult dialogue” across the left. As you note, the left 
has historically been wedded to goals of growth, resource ex-
ploitation, and production of cheap meat/dairy and other animal 
products, albeit in an economy controlled by workers, not capi-
talists. Both environmentalism and animal rights directly chal-
lenge the sustainability and justice of this “abundance through 
growth” vision. So the challenge is for us to show that conser-
vation, zero growth, and green energy are compatible with full 
employment and social justice, and that “meat on the table” is 
not the antithesis of poverty. People need to understand what 
the alternative vision is, and how, in concrete terms, it will af-
fect them and their families before they will let go of old al-
legiances to industrial growth. Many people on the left can see 
that building a society on animal exploitation is unsustainable, 
and unjust, but it still takes a lot of convincing to let go. And 
the symbolism of meat is a non-trivial problem in this context. 
Through centuries of human history, and across cultures, ac-
cess to meat has been the key dividing line between rich and 
poor. Over the last century unprecedented numbers of people 
have moved out of poverty, and are understandably suspicious 
when told that just as meat has come within reach, it’s going to 
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be snatched away again because animals have rights. Animal 
advocates need to address this suspicion head on, demonstrate 
the good faith of our movement, and its solidarity with working 
people, minorities, and other oppressed groups.
BTS: Zoopolis has been awarded the 2013 Biennial Book Prize 
by the Canadian Philosophical Association. So it has not fallen 
“dead-born from the press,” as David Hume lamented about 
one of his works. Overall, are you encouraged by how its ideas 
have been received?
DONALDSON/KYMLICKA: We have been pleasantly sur-
prised and encouraged. Since the book came out, we’ve been 
privileged to meet a lot of people in the animal movement who 
have been thinking and working along similar lines, trying to 
find new ways to get beyond the species apartheid/extinction-
ist model of animal liberation, while still being firmly com-
mitted to fundamental basic rights for animals. When writing 
the book, we felt a bit like we were out there on our own in 
this quest, but we’ve now encountered many people who have 
been working on related dimensions of this project, and who 
see links with our book. So we feel as though our ideas have 
landed on fertile ground, and we are very excited to be able to 
draw on these new contacts and influences to develop our ideas 
further. We are cautiously optimistic that advocates in the ani-
mal and environmental movements are recognizing how much 
common ground we share, and the response to the book has 
confirmed this. We have also been encouraged by responses 
from the political theory/political philosophy community. It 
seems there may be more closet animal advocates out there 
than we realized! Many political theorists have been wary of 
the predominance of utilitarian and post-humanist philosophy 
in theorizing about animals, and of the anti-liberal and deep-
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ecology trends in environmental thought, all of which seem to 
ignore or trivialize the importance of fundamental liberal-dem-
ocratic principles of individual rights, the rule of law, demo-
cratic citizenship, and distributive justice. Radical as our book 
is in its proposals, it is nonetheless firmly rooted in these basic 
liberal-democratic commitments. Our sense is that there are a 
fair number of people who share this general political orienta-
tion who are interested in the animal question, which has been 
nagging at the back of their minds for many years, but who 
have been reluctant to push the issue because they didn’t see a 
way to combine their animal commitments with their liberal-
democratic commitments. So we may be in luck with the right 
message at the right time.
BTS: Thank you.
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